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JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from proceedings in a district court 
concerning an action by shareholders against related corporations 
and their principals. The Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction 
under Subsection 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code. This Court now 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection 78-2a-3(2)(k) since the 
Supreme Court transferred this case on November 2, 1992 in accordance 
with Subsection 78-2-2(4). 
The Notice of Appeal filed June 23f 1992 (ROA at 696) 
conferred jurisdiction to review all Orders and Judgment adverse 
to plaintiffs and made final by the Order Certifying Order and 
Summary Judgment as Final Judgment dated June 1, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The appellants assert that the pertinent issues and the 
corresponding standard of review are as follows: 
1. Should the plaintiff class have been certified under 
Rule 23(b)(1) or (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or in 
the alternative under Rule 23(b)(3), where the proposed class 
consists of 105 holders of preferred stock having claims based on 
facts such as the company failing to pay dividends, and certain 
insiders selling all of their preferred stock to a controlled 
company at a price per share over 16 times as great as the members 
of the prooosed class could obtain? This is a question of whether 
the trial court misapplied the law, for which no deference is 
owed, or abused its discretion. Call v. West Jordan, 727 P. 2d 180 
(Utah 1986). 
2 
2. Where over one-third (based on liquidation rights) 
of the stock in a holding company is purchased by the company it 
controlsf has there been "any liquidation" under its 1944 Amended 
Articles of Incorporation entitling its shareholders to be paid in 
the manner prescribed therein? This is a question of lawf with no 
need for deference to the trial court's decision. Transamerica 
Cash Reserve v. Dixie Power & Water, 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990). 
3. Are a controlled company and its officers and 
shareholders insulated from any fiduciary duty to the shareholders 
of its holding company? This is a question of lawf with no need 
for deference to the trial court's decision. Id. 
4. In order to resolve disputes over a corporation's 
control, does the business judgment rule justify that corporation's 
secretly purchasing of all of certain insiders' preferred stock of 
its holding company at a price per share over 16 times as great as 
the price the other holders of that stock could obtain from the 
corporation or anyone else? This is a question of law, with no 
need for deference to the trial court's decision. Id. 
5. Must every action for breach of fiduciary duty of 
the officers and directors of a corporation be brought as a derivative 
action? This is a question of law, with no need for deference to 
the trial court's decision. Id. 
6. May punitive damages be awarded against the officers 
and directors for breach of fiduciary duty when only equitable 
relief involving the company, and no general or compensatory 
damages from the officers and directors, is specifically sought? 
3 
This is a question of law, with no need for deference to the trial 
court's decision. Id. 
7. Were plaintiffs entitled to amend their Complaints 
to allege additional acts of oppression against the minority 
shareholders and to specifically claim a right to a partial rescission 
of a sale of stock when the case was still in the discovery and 
motion stage? This involves a question as to whether the trial 
court abused its discretion. Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 
(Utah 1984). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The interpretation of the following Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is determinative of certain issues in this appeal: 
Rule 15 provides in pertinent part: 
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court 
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be 
freely given when justice so requires. 
Rule 23 is set forth in the addendum at the end of this 
Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs are holders of preferred stock in defendant 
Insurance Investment Company ("II"). II holds most of the voting 
stock of the defendant Equitable Life and Casualty Insurance Company 
("Equitable"). These companies and their principal officers, 
R. Earl Ross ("Earl") and E. Roderick Ross ("Rod"), are all jointly 
referred to as the "Equitable defendants", and sometimes herein as 
"defendants". 
Plaintiff Leontine C. Pond ("Pond"), and later plaintiff 
4 
Merle G. Hyer Company ("Hyer"), have sought to represent a class 
composed of all holders of II preferred stock, except for Earl, 
Rod, and their relatives ("the Ross family"). The trial court 
declined to certify this plaintiff class. 
Although since the early 1940's Equitable has grown and 
been quite profitable, the plaintiff class has never shared any 
benefits arising therefrom, nor are any foreseeable. A share of 
II preferred stock sold during World War II at a par value of $1 
and now represents a liquidation value of over $80. Nevertheless 
dividends have never been greater than $.06 per share, and have 
only been declared 3 times in the last 35 years. There is no 
market for the stock, but members of the Ross family have been 
willing to pay around $3 per share for it. 
In 1986 a dispute among members of the Ross family 
developed over control of Equitable. The following year, in order 
to end this dispute, the members in the minority were essentially 
allowed to liquidate their direct and indirect ownership interest 
in Equitable. Equitable bought all of their stock interest, 
including II preferred stock, for an amount approximating its 
liquidation value. This was paid in the form of cash and a new 
issue of Equitable preferred stock, with the latter likely to be 
redeemed over a period of about 10 years. 
Although this transaction was to be kept secret, it 
became apparent that some transaction had been consummated. After 
this action was initiated, and a motion to compel was granted, 
discovery revealed most of the pertinent facts. 
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Plaintiffs sued on several bases, including the premise 
that since a de facto partial liquidation had taken place, they 
should be entitled to participate therein. The trial court ruled 
that they failed to state a cause of action on that basis. 
Plaintiffs also based their suit on the premise that 
fiduciary duties were violated when defendants used the assets of 
Equitable to benefit only certain shareholders, namely, the Ross 
family shareholders that were bought out. The trial court eventually 
granted defendants summary judgment on this issue as well, apparently 
on the basis of the presumption that defendants1 actions were 
taken in good faith reliance on their business judgment. The 
Equitable defendants had also argued that there could be no liability 
for punitive damages in the absence of a prayer for actual damages; 
that II was not involved in any transaction and plaintiffs were not 
shareholders of Equitable, and so Equitable owed them no fiduciary 
duty; and that Pond and Hyer had no cause of action as individual 
shareholders. 
Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to include 
a cause of action based on oppressive treatment of the minority 
shareholders. That motion was denied. 
Only the Equitable defendants have vigorously defended 
this action, and the orders and judgment have only been applicable 
to them. Nevertheless, these orders are appealable since the 
trial court certified the Order and Summary Judgment as final. 
The facts in more detail are as follows: 
1. Pond is a resident of Lewiston, Cache County, State 
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of Utah, and Hyer is a Utah corooration doing business in that same 
city and county. ROA at 2f 158. 
2. Defendants Equitable and II are Utah corporations 
doing business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and defendants 
Earl and Rod are residents of that same county. ROA at 158-9, 205. 
3. Pond was issued her 500 shares of II preferred stock 
after the death of her husband/ Stillman H. Pond, upon the cancellation 
of the certificates that had been issued to him when he purchased 
them during their marriage in the early 1940's. ROA at 3. 
4. Hyer is and has been at least since November of 1970 
the owner of 1,175 shares of preferred stock of II. ROA at 159, 206. 
5. There are a total of about 105 persons, including 
the named plaintiffs, who are similarly situated, and who together 
hold about 30% of the II preferred stock which is outstanding. 
ROA at 63, 475-76. 
6. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, plaintiffs Pond and Hyer sought to bring this action as 
a class action on their own behalf and on behalf of all other 
similarly situated owners of preferred stock in II. ROA at 5, 160-61. 
7. All other holders of preferred shares in II are 
similarly situated to plaintiffs except the named individual 
defendants and their close relatives who with them make or made up 
the Ross Family. ROA 475-76. 
8. Many stockholders of this proposed class are probably 
not residents of this state, and the names of some stockholders 
are unknown to plaintiffs Pond and Hyer and cannot with due diligence 
7 
be ascertained by them. ROA at 160, 207. However, an effort to 
bring them all before the court has met with some limited success 
as indicated by the attempted intervention of eleven other plaintiffs. 
ROA at 493, 532. 
9. The attorneys for the plaintiffs are experienced 
and capable in litigation in the field of corporate law and have 
actively conducted and been responsible for the plaintiffs1 case 
herein. ROA at 2, 5, 38. 
10. II is a holding company, holding Equitable common 
stock. ROA at 475. As of October 31, 1986, Equitable only had one 
class of stock outstanding, and II owned about 63.3% of that Equitable 
stock. ROA at 7, 39. 
11. At that time II held approximately 3.717 shares of 
Equitable common stock for each share of its own stock outstanding, 
common and preferred. ROA at 15, 38. 
12. Under the Amended Articles of Incorporation of 
II dated July 17, 1944, in "the event of any liquidation" of II, 
the holders of the preferred stock would be entitled to be paid at 
least as much for one of their shares as would be paid for each 
share of II common stock. ROA at 9-10, 42. 
13. On November 17, 1986, Equitable offered to purchase 
up to 115,500 shares of its own stock for $22.50 per share on or 
before December 3, 1986. ROA at 6-7, 39. 
14. Pursuant to that offer, Equitable paid a total of 
$2,152,404 for its own stock. No Equitable stock was purchased 
from II. Deposition of Earl Roderick Ross taken June 10, 1991 -
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ROA at 759, 549 (Rod Depo), Exh. 1, 4th page; Addendum hereto, 
15. Very few purchases of Equitable stock had taken 
place during the preceeding five years. The purchase price ranged 
from about $2.00 to $4.00 per share. It was not listed on any 
exchange and no over-the-counter sales were made. ROA at 7, 39. 
16. In fact, during those preceeding five years, only 
members of the Ross family would purchase Equitable or IT oreferre 
stock, and then only for less than $5 per share. Rod Depo at 
120-21. Deposition of Raymond Earl Ross taken June 11, 1991 - ROA 
at 760, 549 (Earl Depo) at 67-71. 
17. As of October 31, 1986, the Ross Family owned or 
controlled all or nearly all of the voting common stock of II and 
about 70% of the II preferred stock. ROA at 475-78. 
18. As of October 31, 1986, three members oE the Ross 
Family, Earl, Rod, Diane Ross Worthen (now known as Diane Ross 
Gandre), served as directors of II and Equitable. Rod Depo at 27, 
19. Rod and Earl determined that with the stock owned 
or beneficially owned by themselves and by Earl's sisters and 
mother, they could control II, and hence Equitable, if they could 
control most of the stock owned by the Roderick Earl Ross Memorial 
Foundation. Earl Depo at 12, 19. 
20. Since they, along with Earl's sister Diane Gandre, 
were three of the three or four trustees of the Foundation, they 
arranged for a sale of about 1,200 shares of the Foundation's 
II common stock to Jim Bowlden for about $30 a share, or a total 
of about $35,000. Earl Depo at 11, 14. 
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21. Defendant Galen Ross objected to this sale by 
the Foundation, and submitted an offer for the same stock for a 
total of less than $100 more. Earl Depo at 17-18. Despite this 
objection, the sale took place in 1986, which effectively resulted 
in the complete control of Equitable by Earl and Rod. Earl Depo 
at 10-14. Rod Depo at 11-13. Various other takeover attempts and 
litigation began after that sale. ROA at 476-77. 
22. Earl and Rod withstood the threats to their control 
of Equitable by means of litigation and through Equitablefs said 
purchase of its own stock set forth above. ROA at 477. 
23. The threat to Earl and Rod's control was finally 
eliminated by Equitable's secret purchase of all of the II common 
and preferred stock and Equitable stock held directly or indirectly 
by defendants Galen Ross, Connie Ross, David Ross and Betsy Ross 
Rapps, the members of the Ross family who had been pushed from a 
position of control. ROA at 437, 476-78. 
24. This was paid in the form of cash and a new issue 
of Equitable preferred stock, with the latter likely to be redeemed 
over a period of about 10 years. ROA at 422-30. 
25. The 1988 Annual Statement reported that in the 
purchase of its own stock pursuant to the 1986 offer, and in the 
purchase from "a coalition," Equitable paid a total consideration 
of $6,809,596 for the equivalent of 300,609 of its own shares, or 
an average of $22.65 per share. As part of this purchase, Equitable 
bought over one-third (based on liquidation rights) of the outstandi 
II stock. Rod Depo, Exh. 1, 4th page, included in the Addendum here 
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26. That same 1988 Annual Statement reported that 
each share it held of II stock, both common and preferred, was 
equivalent to 3.717 shares of its own stock "(based on liquidation 
rights)." Id.. Thus those same liquidation rights would result in 
an average value of over $84 per share of II stock. 
27. In 1988 Jim Bowlden sold the II common stock he 
held to Earl's mother for a little over $100,000, or a little over 
$83 per share. Earl Depo at 15. 
28. When equitable made that secret purchase of stock, 
including II preferred stock, from the said "coalition" of insiders, 
it made no comparable offer to purchase the II preferred stock 
held by the plaintiff class, which would have meant an additional 
investment of less than $1,730,000. ROA at 11, 43. 
29. All of Earl's sisters are now serving as directors 
of Equitable, namely Lana Ross Hall, Rita Mahmood, and Julie 
Foster, the latter serving without voting powers. Earl Depo at 
22, Rod Depo at 117. 
30. Each director of Equitable receives an annual 
compensation for being a director of at least $10,000. Earl 
Depo at 22. The total earnings of Earl and Rod have not been 
disclosed, in accordance with their attorney's direction. Earl. 
Depo at 4. Earl's sisters all work for Equitable and receive 
additional annual compensation of about $75,000. Earl Depo at 23. 
31. Dividends have been declared or paid by II in 
only very few years since the issuance of the preferred stock 
therein, and then only at the minimum rate, 6% of the $1 par 
11 
value, IT has indicated that dividends have been paid to the 
preferred shareholders of II on four occasions, namely, in 1954, 
1981, 1983 and 1984, and seven times total. ROA 211-12, 500. 
32. Pond initiated this action by means of a Complaint 
dated September 21, 1989, on behalf of herself and all other 
similarly situated holders of preferred stock in II. ROA at 2. 
She then filed a Motion for Maintenance as Class Action dated 
September 22, 1989. ROA at 18. 
33. The Equitable defendants opposed that motion, 
arguing that 105 members of the class were not numerous enough; 
Pond was not typical since others had not expressed an interest in 
joining the lawsuit; she had only 2% of the II preferred stock and 
she and her counsel had not proven they could adequately represent 
the class. ROA at 60. 
34. This opposition proved successful, with the trial 
court denying Pond's Motion by means of a Minute Entry dated 
November 22, 1989. ROA at 84. The court later clarified that its 
basis for the denial was that the case was not the type appropriately 
pursued as a class action. The court also stated that additional 
authority on the matter would be considered. ROA at 738. 
35. Pursuant to that invitation, Pond filed a Renewed 
Motion for Maintenance as Class Action dated February 13, 1990 and 
supported it by extensive citation to case law. ROA at 103. That 
Renewed Motion was denied by means of an Order dated June 20, 
1990. ROA at 218. 
36. Meanwhile, the parties had stipulated on May 22, 
12 
1990 to the intervention of plaintiff Hyer, and had acknowledged 
the filing of its Complaint dated April 18, 1990 in which it 
sought to be a class representative along with Pond. ROA at 201, 
158. 
37. To discover the pertinent documents despite the secrecy 
agreed upon among the defendants, plaintiffs obtained an Order 
Compelling Production. ROA at 275. 
38. The Equitable defendants filed a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment dated August 8, 1990, in which they sought a 
dismissal of all claims against them based on the existence of a 
de facto partial liquidation of II. ROA at 269. An Order dated 
October 24, 1990 granted that Motion. ROA at 317. 
39. The Equitable defendants subsequently filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment as to all remaining issues, dated 
September 24, 1991. ROA at 390. In support of that Motion they 
argued, among other matters, that there could be no liability for 
punitive damages in the absence of a prayer for actual damages; 
II was not involved in any transaction and plaintiffs were not 
shareholders of Equitable, and so Equitable owed them no fiduciarv 
duty; that their actions were justified on the basis of business 
judgment; and that Pond and Hyer had no cause of action as individual 
shareholders. ROA at 484, 393. 
40. Pond and Hyer opposed that Motion and filed a a 
proposed Amended Complaint showing the proposed intervention of 
eleven (11) additional representative plaintiffs, and including 
and clarifying the causes of action for oppressive conduct and for 
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the alternative right to partial rescission so that all shareholders 
would have the right to sell an equal percentage of their II 
preferred stock to Equitable, ROA at 495f 529. 
41. However, the trial court granted the Equitable 
defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment by means of an Order and 
Summary Judgment dated December 9, 1991, and in connection therewith, 
refused to allow the Complaint to be amended and denied the additional 
intervention. ROA at 596, 603, 608. 
42. The said Order and Summary Judgment decided all 
claims pertaining to the Equitable defendants. Therefore it was 
certified as a final judgment by means of an Order Certifying 
Order and Summary Judgment as Final Judgment (Rule 54(b)) dated 
June 1, 1992. ROA at 693. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Since no appealed order or judgment specified any particular 
basis, all arguments made by the Equitable defendants are addressed. 
1. The plaintiff class should have been certified under 
Rule 23(b)(1) or (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or in 
the alternative under Rule 23(b)(3). The proposed class consists 
of 105 holders of preferred stock, which is numerous enough. 
They all have claims based on facts such as the company 
failing to pay dividends, and certain insiders selling all of 
their preferred stock to a controlled company at a price per share 
over 16 times as great as the members of the proposed class could 
obtain. Thus the similar issues overwhelmingly predominate over 
any variation among the members of the class. 
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The class is adequately represented by the representative 
plaintiffs and their attorneys, and the representative plaintiffs 
are typical of the class. 
The likely remedies are such that all members of the 
class should be included, with no right to opt out. Although the 
plaintiffs have the burden to show a class action is appropriate, 
that burden has been met and the class action is favored. 
2. Where over one-third (based on liquidation rights) 
of the stock in a holding company is ourchased by the company it 
controls, there has been "any liquidation" under its 1944 Amended 
Articles of Incorporation, entitling its shareholders to be paid in 
the manner prescribed therein. 
Whether there has been "any liquidation" is a question 
of fact. "Any liquidation" includes partial liquidation, and is 
not limited to any statutory definition. 
3. A controlled company and its officers and shareholders 
are not insulated by artificialities from any fiduciary duty to 
the shareholders of its holding company. 
It is well settled that courts will look to the substance 
and actualities, rather than convenient corporate formations, in 
order to determine the realities. 
4. A corporation is not justified in secretly purchasing 
all of certain insiders1 preferred stock of its holding company, 
at a price per share over 16 times as great as the price the other 
holders of that stock could obtain from the corporation or anyone 
else, especially in order to resolve disputes over a corporation's 
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control, despite the business judgment rule. 
Equitable had an obligation to offer all holders of II 
preferred stock the same price for its stock that it paid to the 
insiders for such stock. Equitable's directors were not excused 
by the business judgment rule when they preferentially used the 
corporate assets, since the purchase was made to retain control. 
5. Every action for breach of fiduciary duty of the 
officers and directors of a corporation need not be brought as a 
derivative action. 
The shareholders have a claim for direct relief where, 
as here, the corporation violated their rights as shareholders. 
6. Punitive damages may be awarded against the officers 
and directors for breach of fiduciary duty when only equitable 
relief involving the company, and no general or compensatory 
damages from the officers and directors, is specified in the prayer. 
Equitable relief is sufficient to justify punitive 
damages. Additionally, general or compensatory damages may yet be 
awarded, since plaintiffs' remedies are not restricted by the 
prayers of their complaints. 
The statutory exception as to when punitive damages may 
be awarded should be narrowly construed, and not bar punitive 
damages where the judgment results in a substantial financial loss 
to the defendants. 
7. Plaintiffs were entitled to amend their complaints 
to allege additional acts of oporession against the minority 
shareholders and to specifically claim a right to a oartial rescission 
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of a sale of stock when the case was still in the discovery and 
motion stage. 
An amended complaint can include claims already dismissed 
so that they are not deemed waivedr although the law of the case 
is applicable. An added cause of action should be allowed during 
the discovery phase when it is based in large part on facts already 
pleaded. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE PLAINTIFF CLASS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CERTIFIED UNDER 
RULE 23(B)(1) OR (2) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, OR IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE UNDER RULE 23(B)(3), WHERE THE PROPOSED CLASS 
CONSISTS OF 105 HOLDERS OF PREFERRED STOCK HAVING CLAIMS BASED ON 
FACTS SUCH AS THE COMPANY FAILING TO PAY DIVIDENDS, AND CERTAIN 
INSIDERS SELLING ALL OF THEIR PREFERRED STOCK TO A CONTROLLED 
COMPANY AT A PRICE PER SHARE OVER 16 TIMES AS GREAT AS THE MEMBERS 
OF THE PROPOSED CLASS COULD OBTAIN. 
The class is numerous enough. 
Defendants have argued that the class size of 105 preferred 
shareholders is insufficient to satisfy the first requirement of 
Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that the class be 
so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. ROA at 63. 
The court in the case of Dameron v. Sinai Hospital of 
Baltimore, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 1404, 1408 (D. Md. 1984) stated, 
"A class consisting of as few as 25 to 30 members raises the 
presumption that joinder would be impractical." 
The case of Ikonen v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 122 F.R.D. 258, 
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26 2 (S.D. Cal. 1988) may have put the presumptive figure somewhat 
higher. It stated that generally "classes of 20 are too small, 
classes of 20-40 may or may not be big enough depending on the 
circumstances of each case, and 40 or more are big enough." 
Examples of cases where numerosity was reviewed and the 
class certified include Smith v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.y 124 
F.R.D. 665 (D. Kan. 1989) with a class of 96, and Cherry Hills 
Farms v. City of Cherry Hills, 670 P.2d 779 (Colo. 1983) with a 
class of 92. 
Clearly the class of 105 preferred shareholders in the 
instant matter is numerous enough. 
Apparently the trial court agreed on this point. The 
court's stated that the basis for the denial of the Motion for 
Maintenance as Class Action was that it did not seem like the tyoe 
of a case for a class action. ROA at 738. That would not appear 
to indicate that at 105 members the class was not numerous enough. 
The class is adequately represented. 
Defendants have argued that plaintiff Pond (sometimes 
referred to herein as plaintiff) is an inadequate representative 
of the class because she owns only 2% of the preferred stock 
outstanding. ROA at 65. Even if this percentage is accurate, 
it in no way disqualifies her as a representative. 
In the case of Epstein v. Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 387, 391 
(E.D. La. 1970) (ROA at 132-36), the court stated, "a single 
plaintiff may represent the entire class, no matter how small his 
claim may be ....", citing Green v. Wolf Corporation, 406 F.2d 
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291 (2nd Cir. 1968) and Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 
563 (2nd Cir. 1968) . 
The Epstein opinion noted that the Green case allowed a 
single plaintiff to represent a class exceeding 2f000 shareholders 
who purchased stock pursuant to three separate prospectuses, 
despite no interventions being filed. The Eisen ruling allowed a 
single odd-lot investor with damages of $70 to represent a class 
of some 3,750,000 individuals, that court stating, "If we have to 
rely on one litigant to assert the rights of a large class then 
rely we must." 391 F.2d at 563. 
Defendants contend plaintiff's counsel have not demonstrated 
they are capable of representing the intended class of preferred 
shareholders. ROA at 65. However, the Affidavit of Plaintiff's 
Counsel (ROA at 79-81) shows that plaintiff's counsel satisfy the 
requirement of adequate representation that "the olaintiff's 
attorney must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to 
conduct the proposed litigation." Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
508 F.2d 239, 247, (3rd Cir. 1975), cert, denied 421 U.S. 1011, 95 
S.Ct. 2415, 44 L.Ed.2d 679 (1975), as cited in 3B Moore's Federal 
Practice, (2nd Ed.) 1[23.07[1] at 23-193. 
Defendants complained that the plaintiff "made no 
demonstration of her financial capability to fund what is inevitably 
going to be an expensive lawsuit." ROA at 65. Along those same 
lines, defendants call into question the ability of plaintiff's 
counsel to bear the expenditures of time and money necessary to 
vigorously pursue this litigation as a class action. ROA at 65. 
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In the Affidavit of Plaintiff's Counsel, plaintiff's 
attorney attested that plaintiff's counsel is wi-^iu .1 id able to 
spend the time and advance the necessary costs, and the lack of 
prompt reimbursement will in no way compromise the vigorous prosecution 
of this litigation. ROA at 79-81. Since the class is not extremely 
large, costs will not be burdensome. 
Since there are no factors present which cast doubt on 
plaintiff's ability to reimburse counsel, such as a pending bankruptcy 
or financial distress, any contention that plaintiff lacks adequate 
financial resources to conduct this litigation is irrelevant. 
Genden v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 114 F.R.D. 48 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (ROA at 137-139). 
Any doubts about adequacy of representation should be 
resolved in favor of certification since the "courts presumably 
are aware of the irony that a dismissal for inadequacy of 
representation may as a practical matter in some situations result 
in no representation at all of the class interest." 3B Moore's 
Federal Practice , ( 2rid Ed. ) f 23 . 07 [ 1 ] at 23 -1 99 . 
Apparently the trial court agreed that the class was 
adequately represented since the stated basis for the denial of 
certification was that it did not seem like the type of a case for 
a class action. ROA at 738. 
The member's desire to join is not an element of typicality. 
Defendants have argued that plaintiff has not proven 
that she is typical of the class because she has not shown that 
other members of the class care whether or not they have a cause 
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of action. ROA at 63-64. The cases cited do not stand for that 
proposition. 
The cases of White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412 
(1971) and Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263 (10th 
Cir. 1975) demonstrate the need for each member of the class to have 
a legally cognizable claim, not the need for. each member to 
subjectively desire to oursue that claim. 
Even if a subjective desire to receive the benefits of 
the action were necessary, that would be deemed present in the 
instant matter. It is only logical that a shareholder would want 
the opportunity to sell his stock for over $80 per share, when he 
can presently only sell it for less than $5 per share. 
Typicality is satisfied by the similarity of claims. 
In the case of Epstein v. Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 387 
(E.D. La. 1970) (ROA at 132-36), a plaintiff class composed of 
selling shareholders was certified in a case alleging violations 
of the Securities Exchange Act by reason of misleading information 
in the tender offer. 
The defendants in that action arqued that a class should 
not be certified because of individual issues. They argued that 
each member had to establish his own reliance on the tender offer, 
show it was material in his decision, and prove the damages he 
suffered. The court rejected this contention on a number of grounds. 
Mainly the court found that the common issues of law and 
fact predominated over any such individual issues. Also, it cited 
cases showing that materiality had to be measured by an objective 
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"reasonable man" standard. Additionally, it reasoned that since 
the shares were so 1 I at 11: 1 e same price pursi 1 ant to the same tender 
offer, each member of the class suffered the same loss per share. 
Finally, it cited cases showing that where there is nondisclosure, 
reliance plays a role that is small or nonexistant. 
In another case, Genden v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, 114 F.R.D. 48, 52-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (ROA at 139), the court 
emphasized the need to examine the question of liability in 
determinining the issues of commonality and typicality. It quoted 
from the case of Dura-Bilt Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 89 
F.R.D. 87, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) when it stated: "The typicality 
prerequisite requires plaintiff to show that plaintiff's claim 
'arises from the same event or course of conduct that gives rise 
to claims of other class members and the claims are based on the 
same legal theory.'" 
In the instant matter, the common factual elements 
applicable to all members of the class are that they (1) owned 
preferred stock in 11 on or about November 4, 1987, (2) were not 
part of the "Ross Family" which controlled well over 90 percent of 
the voting stock and about two-thirds of the preferred stock of II 
and took the act • noiained of, a nci (3) • lid not and rould not 
participate in :. :ie \ransaction involving the sale of about one-third 
of the said shares of II preferred stock to Equitable, and in 
fact w< L supposed to learn about the said transaction, and thus 
were left with the ability to sell their stock at only a small fraction 
of the amount for which the insiders had sold their stock to the 
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company. 
All of the members of the class would therefore have the 
same cause of action in that they were owed a fiduciary duty as holder; 
of preferred stock in II by all of the defendants. Likewisef the 
actions taken by the defendants breached that duty to all of the 
members of the class. 
The damages are also easily determinable and distributable 
among the members of the class. Whatever is determined to be the 
proper remedy for this breach of fiduciary duty should apply to 
all of the members of the class in prooortion to their ownership 
of preferred stock in II. 
Paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of Rule 23 apply. 
PARAGRAPH (B)(1) 
Paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 23 applies to this case. That 
paragraph concerns the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications. 
The case of Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Banky 52 F.R.D. 532 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (ROA at 140-41) is instructive on this point. 
In that case, a credit card holder brought a class 
action to challenge the imposition of a finance charge. First of 
all the court pointed out that "when there is a choice between a 
(b)(1) and (b)(3) class action, the court should order that the 
suit be maintained as a class action under (b)(1), rather than 
under (b)(3)." _Id. at 534. 
The Zachary court then found the existence of the risk 
referred to in Rule 23(b)(1)(A) of "inconsistent or varying 
adjudications with resoect to individual members of the class 
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which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the 
party opposing the class/1 since "the finance charge exacted by 
defendant is either legal or it is illegal as to all members." Id. 
Finally, the « -et torth in Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) of "adjudications with respect to individual members 
of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of 
the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications 
or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their 
interests". Id. 
Just as the credit card holders in the Zachary case 
were all treated the same way with respect to the contested finance 
charge, so also in the instant matter were a] ] of the preferred 
shareholders other than the defendants subjected to the same 
treatment by the insiders. It is only natural that as a practical 
matter, great weight would be given to the decision of the first 
court to address these identical issues. 
In addition, as indicated in the prayer of the Complaint, 
punitive damamges are sought. Iii practicality and fairness, this 
should be applied to all members of the class according to their 
respective ownership of preferred shares of II, rather than to 
just be awarded to the first shareholder who sues, especially if in 
the event that absent class certification, the others would be 
barred by a statute of limitation. 
In the note of the Rules Advisory Committee oertaining 
to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it 
sets forth the reasons why actions by shareholders often fit into 
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this category: 
This clause takes in situations where the 
judgment in a nonclass action by or against an 
individual member of the class, while not 
technically concluding the other members, 
might do so as a practical matter. The vice 
of an individual action would lie in the fact 
that the other members of the class, thus 
practically concluded, would have had no 
representation in the lawsuit. ... For much 
the same reason actions by shareholders to 
comoel the declaration of a dividend, the 
prooer recognition and handling of redemption 
or pre-emption rights, or the like (or actions 
by the corporation for corresponding declarations 
of rights), should ordinarily be conducted as 
class actions although the matter has been 
much obscured by the insistence that each 
shareholder has an individual claim. [Citations.] 
The same reasoning applies to an action which 
charges a breach of trust by an indenture 
trustee or other fiduciary similarly affecting 
the members of a large class of security 
holders or other beneficiaries, and which 
requires an accounting or like measures to 
restore the subject of the trust. [Emphasis 
added.] 
PARAGRAPH (B)(2) 
Turning now to Paragraph (b)(2) of Rule 23, that is 
applicable where: 
The party opposing the class has acted or 
refused to act on grounds generally applicable 
to the class, thereby making appropriate final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory 
relief with respect to the class as a whole. 
Clearly the first requirement of the grounds being 
generally aplicable to the class is met here. As was just mentioned, 
all of the grounds which the representative plaintiff has are 
equally applicable to all members of the class. 
As to the second requirement, the major relief set forth 
in the Complaint is equitable, requiring particular action on 
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the part of the defendants with respect to the class as a whole. 
Specifically, paragraph l.b. of the prayer would allow Equitable 
the option of exchanging its common stock for the II preferred 
stock, and tendering a stated amount per share t -» h\v Yark that 
common stock. 
The case of Fradkin v. Ernst, 98 F.R.D. 478, 490-91 
(N.D. Ohio 1983) set forth the two part test referred to above, 
and found that the oroposed class of shareholders should be certified 
since the defendants1 conduct had a similar effect upon all members 
of the class and the prayer sought declaratory and injunctive 
relief. 
There should be no right to opt out and notice is unnecessary. 
Not only can and should this lawsuit be pursued on 
behalf of the class specified, but it should only be pursued 
in that manner, with all members of the class being included. 
In paragraoh (c)(3) of Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, it draws a distinction between the treatment of 
classes meeting the conditions of paragraphs (b)(1) or (b)(2) of 
that Rule and the treatment of classes meeting the conditions of 
paragraph (b)(3). In the case of the former tyoe of classes, all 
members are included and none excluded, thus obviating the need 
for notice to determine which members wish to be excluded. As 
shown above, the instant matter should fall into that former category, 
including all members of the class regardless of any desires 
to be excluded. 
In the case of Bowen v. General Motors Corp. A C Spark 
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Plug Div., 542 F. Supp. 94, 98 (N.D. Ohio 1981), the court stated 
that "notice is descretionary in 23(b)(2) actions and there is no 
opt-out privilege given to absent class members." 
The case of Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co,, 784 F.2d 
1546, 1554 (11th Cir. 1986) (ROA at 131) reversed the trial court's 
ruling allowing members of the class to opt out. 
When there is no right to opt out, notice is unnecessary. 
In Fradkin v. Ernst, supra, where there was certification of a 
class of 2600 shareholders, the court declined to require notice 
be given. The court in Lindquist v. Bowen, 633 F. Supp. 846, 
862 (W.D. Mo. 1986) likewise declined to order notice be given. 
The burden of proof for a class action has been met. 
Defendants have indicated that plaintiffs bear the 
burden to prove that this matter should be maintained as a class 
action. ROA at 61-62. This burden has been met. 
Submitting this factual information in affidavit form is 
sufficient. As was indicated in the case of Genden v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 114 F.R.D. 48, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(ROA at 137-39), a motion for class certification can be granted 
without "an evidentiary hearing or a 'mini-trial' on the merits of 
the complaint." The Genden court went on to grant such a motion 
based on the record and on the affidavits that were submitted. 
On the other hand, an evidentiary hearing should be held 
before a court dismisses the class aspect of a case. Rossin 
v. Southern Union Gas Co., 472 F.2d 707 (10th Cir. 1973). 
Since the plaintiffs' have discharged their obligation 
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as to proof, they are entitled to have the class certified. As 
stated in Lindquist v. Bowenf 63^ F, Supp. 846, 860 (W.n. Mo, 1986), 
if the requirements for class certification have b^en met , the 
plaintiff is entitled to certification. That is, there is a right 
to have the class certified when the requirements are met. 
Class actions are favored. 
The Tenth Circuit has indicatdd that doubts are to be 
resolved in favor of certification: 
[T]he interests of justice require that in a 
doubtful case, such as was presented here when 
considered by the trial court, any error, if 
there is to be one, should be committed in 
favor of allowing the class action. Esplin 
v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1968). 
This is particularly applicable in act ions involving 
stockholders. As stated in the case of Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 
117 F.R.D. 75, 78 (E.D. Pa. 1987): 
Securities actions are particularly suitable 
for class action treatment and any doubts 
should be resolved in favor of allowing a 
class action. Eisenberg v. Gagnonr 766 F..M 
770r 78S (3d Cir. 1985). 
Not only should any doubt be resolved in favor of certi-
fication, but the certification should be under Rule 23(b)(1) 
and/or (2) rather than the more restrictive (b)(3). This princiole 
was set forth in Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 48 F.R.D. 333, 
337 ID I ! 1969) (ROA at 122-26). 
2. WHERE OVER ONE-THIRD (BASED ON LIQUIDATION RIGHTS) 
OF THE STOCK IN A HOLDING COMPANY IS PURCHASED BY THE COMPANY IT 
CONTROLS, THERE HAS BEEN "ANY LIQUIDATION" UNDER ITS 1944 AMENDED 
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, ENTITLING ITS SHAREHOLDERS TO BE PAID IN 
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THE MANNER PRESCRIBED THEREIN. 
Liquidation cannot be ruled absent as a matter of law. 
The case of Jones v. Griffin, 216 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1954) 
concerned the appropriate rate of taxation and involved the question 
as to whether the purchase by a corporation of its preferred stock 
was a partial liquidation. The ooinion ruled that this question 
was a question of fact. 
Likewise in the instant matter, the established facts 
cannot sustain a ruling as a matter of law that there was not any 
liquidation within the meaning of the contractual provisions. 
"Any liquidation" includes a partial liquidation. 
The case law gives numerous examples of where liquidation 
has been determined to have occurred under factual situations 
comparable to that of the instant matter. 
The Equitable defendants claim that "liquidation is an 
all or nothing affair/1 requiring the permanent cessation of 
business, the winding up of affairs, and the complete distibution 
of all assets, and that no act can be said to be a "partial 
liquidation" unless there is a manifest intention and continuing 
purpose to terminate and dissolve the corporation. ROA at 261-62. 
Such is not the law. 
In the Jones case just citedf the Tenth Circuit uoheld 
the jury verdict finding that there was a oartial liquidation 
where the corporation purchased its preferred stock from the 
holders thereof. Nevertheless, in that case the corporation 
continued its business undiminished and at a orofit. Id. at 
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889. 
This principle an-J t tip m nrul * -wmort i aq i1 are also 
found ii the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Quackenbos, 
'H ] M , i >n,| ': j ) . 
[n that case the company reduced is capital account by 
about $400,000, using cash in the same amount to buy stock at the 
market vnl\*->, The taxpayer treated this as a partial liquidation* 
The Commissioner oE Internal Revenue contested that 
there was not a partial 1iquidation, arguing as do the Equitable 
defendants herein that for such to rv; • •< * must be a winding 
up of the corporation, a orocess leadina vo t n a ; liquidation. 
The con i rejected those arguments, affirming that a partial 
liquidation did not require the corporation t» > ''planning a 
cessation of business or in the process of final liquidation." 
Id. Hi 1V7. 
Another example is found in the case of Yankey 
v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1 -L „^ Id 65 0 (101h Ci r. 1945). 
In that caap, the issi corporation formulated a plan 
to purchase preferred stock issued in partial payment of debts of 
a predecessor corporation. The Court affirmed that such payments 
we re received in partial I i < \ \ \ i d a t i • :»\ i i 11 t h o i ig \ i t here wa; * intention 
to curtai I the normal operations of the corporation. Ijd. at 
652. 
Citing the advantage o £ unifoi mi i \ betweei i st ate i :; ix: 
laws and federal tax laws, the Alabama Supreme Court in Bashinsky 
v. Sparks, So. 2d 303 (Ala. 1962) found that Alabama's statutory 
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definition of partial liquidation also did not require the 
corporation's discontinuance of operations. 
The cases of Henderson v, United States, 105 F.2d 461 
(3rd Cir. 1939); Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue, 136 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1943); and Dodd 
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 131 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1942) 
reached similar conclusions. 
Liquidation is not defined by statute. 
These cases cited above generally deal with tax questions 
and statutory definitions of liquidation. Although these statutory 
definitions show that the winding up of a corporation is not 
required for there to be a partial liquidation, the applicable 
definition of liquidation in the instant matter would not be 
restricted to such statutory definitions. Since the instant 
matter does not solely concern tax matters, the finder of fact 
will not be confined to the corresponding definitions in deciding 
whether there has been "any liquidation" entitling the preferred 
shareholders to the same payment per share as the common shareholders. 
Rather, the more general common definitions will apply. 
The opinion in Thornton v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
159 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1947) points out a difference between 
a statutory definition of liquidation, and its general definition. 
The definition of liquidation in the tax code at that time 
included the element that shares be surrendered or endorsed. 
Therefore, the general understanding of the word liquidation 
was not relevant: 
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If our general understanding of the meaning of 
the word liquidation be different, it must 
give way to the statutory definition for tax 
purposes. ... 
Here there was no complete cancellation or 
redemption of all or a portion of the stock. 
Without it there was no liquidation, partial 
or complete. This ends the matter. It may be 
that the Mortgage Company at one time intended 
to wind up its affairs, and later changed its 
mind. It distributed some of the money received 
on sale of its assets among its stockholders 
including oetitioner. In a broad or general 
sense or use of the word, it could have been 
described as liquidated. But it was not such 
a partial liquidation as Congress defined that 
term. Id., at 580-581. (Emphasis added.) 
Tn the instant matter, there need not be any such unnatural 
definition applied to "any liquidation." There is no unilateral 
soecial definition that must be employed and might thereby end the 
matter. 
Rather, the trier of fact can and should be allowed to 
look at all of the pertinent facts and decide whether "any liquidation" 
took place when Equitable bought out the holders of about one-third 
of the stock of II, a company which held about 80% of Equitablefs 
stock, without there being a rigid requirement such as the shares 
being cancelled. The trier of fact can make this determination by 
looking at the substance of the transaction, not just the form. 
3. A COMTRMhhKD COMPANY AND ITS OFFICERS AND SHAREHOLDERS 
ARE NOT INSULATED BY ARTIFICIALITIES FROM ANY FIDUCIARY DUTY TO 
THE SHAREHOLDERS OF ITS HOLDING COMPANY. 
Defendants argue that plaintiffs are owed no duty bv 
Equitable or its officers and directors as such, because plaintiffs 
hold stock in the holding company II, not in Equitable itself. 
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ROA at 408. 
The principles which should govern this issue are set 
forth in the case of Brown v. Tenneyy 532 N.E.2d 230 (111. 1988). 
In that case, the subsidiary defended a derivative action on the 
basis that the plaintiff was a shareholder in the holding company, 
not the subsidiary. 
The court pointed out that to accept the subsidiary's 
defense would leave a shareholder of the holding company without a 
remedy even where the holding company was the wrongdoer which 
caused the subsidiary to take the wrongful action. Just by having 
an additional layer, the wrongdoer would be insulated. The law 
does not permit such devices. Id[. at 233. 
The court went on to emphasize the fact that the people 
were real, not the corporate forms, "For beneath the corporate 
cloak beats the heart of its shareholders." Ld. at 234. 
The court then addressed the fact that where the holding 
company and subsidiary share common directors, there is even more 
reason for concern. 
Such interlocking directorates present special 
problems, and the dealings between the two 
corporations must be watched with a jaundiced 
eye. 
... In other words, according to the 
plaintiff, the subsidiary is accountable 
to no one since its shareholder, the holding 
company, is controlled by the wrongdoers. 
There is no justice in denying relief under 
these circumstances, and this court may look 
through the coroorate form. Ld. at 235. 
Additional principles applicable in the instant matter 
on this issue are set forth in the case of Kwick Set Components, 
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Inc. v, Davidson Industries , Inc. , 41] So. 2<1 I M i A 1 a . I (J|R2 ) . In 
that case the dominant corporation was found liable for a debt of 
the subservient corporation. 
The court in that case stated that the legal fiction 
should not allow evasion of responsibility, or to permit any 
inequitable result. 
[T]he legal fiction of separate corporate 
entity should not be so extended "as to enable 
the corporation to become a vehicle to evade 
just responsibility." [Citation]. The theory 
of separate corporate existence can properly be 
discarded, even in the absence of fraud, to 
prevent injustice or inequitable consequences. 
[Citation]. Id., at 136. 
It then stated that the instrumentality doctrine would 
be applicable when the dominant corporation controlled the subservient 
corporation, and the dominant corporation proximately cause the 
action complained of. 
In the instant matter, the entire transaction complained 
about pertained to control. All factions of the Ross family decided 
not to continue to fight over that control, but rather to use 
their instrumentalities to resolve the matter. Control was represented 
by ownership of Equitable stock, directly and through ownership of 
stock in other entities, particularly in II. It was directly 
because of that control through that their decis, could be 
implemented by Equitable giving consideration to the sellers in 
excess of 4 1/2 million dollars in a transaction committing Equitable 
for a period of about 10 years. 
To assert, as the defendants do (ROA at 409) that II was 
not involved in the decision to enter into this transaction and 
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Equitable acted independently is ludicrous. Reality dictates it 
happened otherwise. 
Likewise it is disingenuous to assert that the case of 
Richardson v. Arizona Fuelsy 614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980) stands for 
the proposition that directors can, with impunity, use the corporate 
assets at any time to preferentially benefit only the majority 
shareholders, provided there is no loss to the corporation. ROA 
at 408-409. 
4. A CORPORATION IS NOT JUSTIFIED IN SECRETLY PURCHASING 
ALL OF CERTAIN INSIDERS1 PREFERRED STOCK OF ITS HOLDING COMPANY, 
AT A PRICE PER SHARE OVER 16 TIMES AS GREAT AS THE PRICE THE OTHER 
HOLDERS OF THAT STOCK COULD OBTAIN FROM THE CORPORATION OR ANYONE 
ELSE, ESPECIALLY IN ORDER TO RESOLVE DISPUTES OVER A CORPORATION'S 
CONTROL, DESPITE THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE. 
Equitable should have offered to buy plaintiffs' II preferred shares. 
Equitable should have offered to buy plaintiffs1 II 
preferred shares at the same price and on the same terms as those 
applicable to its purchase of II preferred shares from the defendants 
Galen J. Ross, David E. Ross II, Betsy Ross Rapps, and Connie Ross. 
Its failure to make such an offer was, on its face, a 
breach of the duty owed by defendants, both as directors and as 
controlling stockholders, to the plaintiffs. 
Many of the principles on which this statement is based 
are found in the seminal case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype 
Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). 
In that case, Rodd Electrotype was a corporation in 
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which the Rodd family held the majority of the stock, and the plaintiff 
the minor portion. When Harry Rodd reached the age of 77, he had 
conveyed most of his stock to his children. He was now ready to 
convert some of his remaining stockholdings to cash and retire. 
At about this same time, Joseph Donahue passed away. He had 
worked in the company as well and held the minority interest. 
The company reached an agreement with Harry Rodd to buy 
45 of his 81 shares of stock for a price reflecting the book value 
and liquidating value of that stock, namely $800 a share. The 
corporation declined to buy the 50 shares held by the Donahues on 
the same terms. Joseoh Donahue's widow held 45 of those 50 shares, 
and she sued because the offer to sell her shares was rejected. 
The court first found that the company was a close 
corporation, based on the fact that it had few stockholders, 
little market for corporate stock, and substantial majority stockholder 
participation in the management, direction and operation of the 
corporation. ;[d. at 511. 
It found that due to the similarity with a partnership, 
the stockholders of a close corporation must have a relationship 
of trust, confidence and absolute loyalty, ^d. at 512, 515-518. 
The court stated that the corporate form makes the 
minority stockholders vulnerable to oppressive devices, or 
"freeze-outs." These devices include refusal to declare dividends 
and draining off earnings in the form of exorbitant salaries and 
bonuses to the majority shareholders-officers. JA. at 513. 
The result of such oporessive devices is that the minority 
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stockholders must either wait and passively suffer the losses, or 
seek a buyer at whatever price they can get. _Id. at 514. Since 
an outsider would not knowingly buy into such a position, the 
minority must sell to the majority for less than fair value, and 
that is when the majority has won by these tactics. .Id. at 515. 
Thus, when a close corporation buys its own stock, those 
causing this purchase must act with the utmost qood faith and 
loyalty to the other shareholders. This means they must make 
them the same offer, so that there is no disproportionate benefit 
to the majority. IdL at 518. 
By this means, the minority can also receive the benefits 
of the purchase by the corporation. Those benefits include providing 
a market for their shares and having access to corporate assets 
for personal use, transforming an illiquid investment into a 
liquid one. Id. 
If only the members of the majority group were to receive 
such benefits, there would be a preferential distribution of 
assets, which would be inconsistent with the strict fiduciary 
duty. Id. at 519. 
The case of Comolli v. Comolli, 246 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. 1978), 
discusses some of these same principles in a similar factual setting. 
The facts in the instant matter show that here also the 
defendants had a duty to authorize Equitable to purchase the 
plaintiffs' stock at the same price and on the same terms given to 
the insider sellers. 
In this case as in the cases cited, the holders of less 
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than half of the controlling interest were willing to sell their 
stock to the corporation at what was perceived to be its true 
value• The corporation agreed to buy their stock at that value, 
while making no such offer to the minority stockholders. This 
benefited those who had been part of the majority stockholders by 
giving them a market for their stock and making it liquid, while 
allowing the remainder of the majority stockholders to maintain 
control. 
This case also involves a close corporation. The Ross 
family has controlled the companies and still does. The remaining 
shareholders are few in number, especially when compared to public 
corporations. There is no market for plaintiffs1 stock. The 
majority shareholders are directors and officers and participate 
substantially in the management, direction and operation of the 
corporation. 
Not only has the purchase reduced the amount available 
for dividends, but dividends have historically not been declared, 
which was one of the hallmarks of oppression by the majority. 
Other hallmarks showing that oppression include the high salaries 
enjoyed by the majority shareholders/directors/officers and the 
fact that those not wishing to wait longer than 40 years for a 
return on their investment have had to sell it to the major 
stockholders for far below the value it represents. 
Defendants are not excused by the business judgment rule. 
Defendants argue that the purchase of II preferred stock 
was justified on the basis of the business judgment rule, that is, 
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because of the presumption that the directors acted on an informed 
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company. ROA at 413-14, 
citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. Supr. 1984). 
Defendants state that the presumption cannot be rebutted 
because "the actions of the Equitable board were motivated by the 
business judgment of its board that the buying out of the dissident 
stockholders was necessary to maintain the very existence of the 
corporation." ROA at 413. 
However, the said Aronson case cited by defendants names 
certain conditions under which the business judgment rule will 
aPPT-Yf including the condition that the directors be disinterested. 
Aronson, supra, 473 A.2d at 812. In addition, there must be 
director independence. This is inherent in the presumption that 
actions are taken for business, rather than extraneous, reasons. 
Id. at 816. 
One of the more common reasons a director may not be 
disinterested, and one of the more common extraneous considerations, 
is the natural desire of a director and his fellow directors to 
maintain control. 
Another case cited by defendants, Cheff v. Mathes, 199 
A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964), states that there is no such presumption 
of good faith when a threat to control is involved and the directors 
authorize corporate funds to be used for a purchase of the shares 
of the corporation. In such an instance the burden is on the director 
to show the action was taken in good faith. 
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In the case of proxy fightsf the courts "have not sanctioned 
the use of corporate funds to advance the selfish desires of 
directors to perpetuate themselves in office." And if the board 
causes the corporation to buy out a dissident stockholder "solely 
or primarily because of a desire to perpetuate themselves in 
office, the use of corporate funds for such purposes is improoer." 
Id. 
The said shift in burden was applied in the case of 
Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995 (3rd Cir. 1978). The defendants 
in that case made the conclusory statement that the stock purchase 
was necessary "to meet the real and immediate threat to the 
corporation." The only evidence supporting that statement was 
testimony that a change in management would be disastrous at a 
time when the whole industry was in a very bad way. Therefore, 
the appellate court cited the Cheff case in finding that they had 
"failed to carry their burden of proving that the purhcase was 
made primarily in the corporate interest." .Id. at 1004. 
On the other hand, their was sufficient evidence to support 
the finding of the trial court that the defendants' primary purpose 
for directing the company to purchase its own shares was to perpetuate 
their control of the company, and that was unlawful. Id., at 
1004-5. 
In the instant matter, there are likewise numerous facts 
which show that defendants' primary purpose for expending corporate 
funds to purchase shares of II was to maintain the status quo as 
far as the control of Equitable. 
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The first gambit was made by Earl's family and Rod 
when they approved the sale of a large portion of the Foundation's 
holding of II stock to an individual favorable to them. Then 
there was the Bennett Leasing agreement and Equitable's offer to 
buy its own stock. This latter move by Equitable seems to have 
been motivated by the possibility of a dissolution of II, since 
otherwise control of II meant control of Equitable. 
Then there were the lawsuits putting in issue the legality 
of what had been done, including the legality of the sale of stock 
by the Foundation. Finally the issue of control was resolved by 
Equitablefs purchase of all of the Equitable and related holdings 
of the members of the Ross family, other than Earl's family and Rod. 
Counsel for the Equitable defendants admitted that Equitable 
purchased equitable stock from members of the Ross family "to 
thwart a takeover attempt by Bennett Leasing" and to "make sure 
that the selling group ... would not trv this again, and sell 
Equitable down the river, and initiate another hostile takeover 
attempt." ROA at 74 2-43. 
Even if in the face of all of this evidence that the orimary 
purpose of the stock purchase was to maintain control, the defendants 
believe they can carry their burden of showing otherwise, they 
have to do so before a finder of fact. They certainly cannot 
prevail on this issue as a matter of law without a trial. 
. 5. EVERY ACTION FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY OF THE 
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS OF A CORPORATION NEED NOT BE BROUGHT AS A 
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DERIVATIVE ACTION. 
Defendants argue that any claim against them belongs to 
II or Equitable, and can therefore only be brought as a derivative 
action. ROA at 414-17. 
It is true that if the rights belong to a corporation, 
shareholders can generally only enforce those corporate rights by 
means of a derivative action. The case cited by the defendants, 
Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980), orovides 
an excellent analysis in this respect. In that case, the Court 
analyzed all of the claims asserted and found that each one of 
them was based on rights possessed solely by the corporation. 
It is not true that the claims asserted by the plaintiffs 
in the instant matter belong solely to the corporations, and it is 
not alleged that they belong to any corporation at all. 
Equitable apparently paid a fair price for the stock of 
II and so it was not damaged. Likewise, II does not appear to 
have been damaged since the value of the Equitable stock it holds 
apparently remained unchanged. 
Thus, under the principles enunciated in the Richardson 
case, plaintiff could not have brought a derivative action by 
reason of Equitablefs purchase of II stock. 
However, that case stated that shareholders could have 
direct claims as individuals which might be appropriately pursued 
in the context of a class action. l^ d. at 638. 
The case then quoted Fletcher as stating that it is an 
individual action when the injury is not one to the corporation as 
42 
a whole, but to the shareholder individually. Id., at 639. 
Plaintiffs1 Complaints set forth facts and claims which 
show that the rights of the plaintiffs and the other members of the 
class they represent, held in their individual capacities, were 
violated by all of the defendants working together. These rights 
do not belong to either corporation nor to all of the shareholders 
of either corporation, but only to the stockholders in the described 
class. 
As was stated in the case of Horizon House - Microwave, 
Inc. v. Bazzy, 486 N.E.2d 70, 74 (Mass. App. 1985): 
To the degree that the gravamen of Emil's 
action was abuse of fiduciary duty by a majority 
stockholder, he was not required to bring a 
minority stockholder's derivative suit against 
Microwave but could move against that corporation 
and William directly. 
6. PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED AGAINST THE OFFICERS 
AND DIRECTORS FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY WHEN ONLY EQUITABLE 
RELIEF INVOLVING THE COMPANY, AND NO GENERAL OR COMPENSATORY 
DAMAGES FROM THE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, IS SPECIFIED IN THE PRAYER. 
Equitable relief suffices. 
Defendants argued that punitive damages are not available 
in a suit in equity, citing the Colorado Appellate case of Seal 
v. Hart, 755 P.2d 462 (Colo. App. 1988) dealing with rescission of 
a sale of a cabin. ROA at 53. However, it is not the law in Utah 
that punitive damages are never permitted in a suit in equity. 
In the case of Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 
1978), the trial court had ruled as a matter of law that ounitive 
damages were unavailable in a suit in equity for specific performance 
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and rescission. This was reversed. 
Defendants also have contended that punitive damages are 
not recoverable absent general or compensatory damages. ROA at 
53, 406. The case cited for this proposition, Atkin Wright & 
Miles v. Mountain States Tel., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985), did not 
deal with an action in equity, but rather an action at law based 
on an error in the yellow cages and remedial measures taken, 
in which a jury tried the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages. 
Furthermore, the Atkin opinion did not even address the 
case of Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 535 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978) referred 
to above, let alone overrule that case. 
There is no statutory bar. 
Also, the statute quoted by the defendants (ROA at 406), 
Section 78-18-1(1)(a) of the Utah Code, would not preclude an 
award of punitive damages. 
That statute generally requires an award of compensatory 
or general damages as a condition for an award of punitive damages. 
In the instant matter, a legally protected interest of 
the plaintiff has been violated by these individual defendants. 
It may well be that just and equitable relief will include compensation 
from these defendants for actual damages. As indicated below, 
plaintiffs are entitled to the appropriate relief whether or not 
it is specified in the prayer. This aporopriate relief could 
certainly include an award of compensatory or general damages 
sufficient to satisfy any statutory orerequisite for awarding 
ounitive damages. 
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It would not be surprising at all for the finder of fact 
to find it appropriate to charge all of the defendantsf jointly 
and severally, with the obligation to compensate the plaintiffs 
for the results of the breach of their fiduciary duty, including 
compensation for interest, the frustration and other mental anguish, 
and other consequences of the delay by defendants in discharging 
their obligations. 
There appears to be no Utah case law interpreting this 
statute. The statutory exception to the general common law rules 
allowing punitive damages, as in the case of any other such exception, 
should be narrowly construed. 
It would be anomalous indeed for a court to find under 
this statute that there had been no general or compensatory damages 
awarded in a case where the plaintiff class prevailed and thus 
gained and in large part exercised an option to have Equitable pay 
hundreds of thousands of dollars more for their stock than the class 
could have received otherwise. Likewise it would be anomalous to 
find there had been no general or compensatory damages awarded 
against the named individual defendants even though the value of 
their financial holdings decreased proportionally to that same extent. 
The prayer need not be specific. 
The prayer of plaintiffs' Complaints demands "such other 
relief as the Court may deem just and equitable." Thus there is 
included in the prayer a demand for compensatory and general 
damages to the extent the Court deems them to be just. 
Rule 54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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states in part: 
Except as to a party against whom a judgment 
is entered by default, every final judgment 
shall grant the relief to which the party in 
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even 
if the party has not demanded such relief in 
his pleadings. 
This rule was cited and quoted in part in Behrens v. Raleigh 
Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983), as justification 
for the conclusion in that case that "if the plaintiff were able 
to adduce the necessary foundational evidence at trial, she could 
claim punitive damages under Rule 54(c) without a formal amendment 
of the pleadings." Id. at 1182. 
The Behrens case also quoted on this point 6 J. Moore, 
W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice. 1[54.60 at 1212 -
14 (2d ed. 1983), in part as follows: 
[A] pleading should not be dismissed for legal 
insufficiency unless it appears to a certainty 
that the claimant is entitled to no relief, legal, 
equitable or maritime, under any state of 
facts which could be proved in support of the 
claim, irrespective of the prayer for relief; 
and, except as to a judgment by default, the 
prayer does not limit the relief, legal, 
equitable or maritime, which the court may 
grant. [Emphasis added, footnotes omitted.] 
7. PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINTS 
TO ALLEGE ADDITIONAL ACTS OF OPPRESSION AGAINST THE MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS AND TO SPECIFICALLY CLAIM A RIGHT TO A PARTIAL RESCISSION 
OF A SALE OF STOCK WHEN THE CASE WAS STILL IN THE DISCOVERY AND 
MOTION STAGE. 
Defendants acknowledged that Rule 15 of the Utah Rules 
of CiviL Procedure provides that when a party seeks to amend his 
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pleading, "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." 
ROA at 568. 
Claims previously denied can be reiterated. 
The defendants argued that the proposed Amended Complaint 
should not have been allowed because it included claims that had 
already been adjudicated, including the claim for class certification 
and the claim that there had been a liquidation. ROA at 569. 
Any amended complaint relates back to the start of: the 
lawsuit. Plaintiffs should not have to run the risk of being 
deemed to have waived their rights with respect to the class and 
liquidation claims by omitting them in an amended complaint. 
Therefore the proposed Amended Complaint contained 
allegations pertaining to the certification of a class and the 
partial liquidation of II, although the court had made rulings adverse 
to these claims. However, the court would not have changed the 
law of the case by allowing the filing of the Amended Complaint, 
especially if the order of allowance specifically so indicated. 
In any event, the law of the case would not preclude 
certification of the class. Kas v. Financial General Bankshares, 
Inc., 105 F.R.O. 453 (D.C. 1984); 3B Moore's Federal Practice, (2d 
ed.) l[23.07[ll at 23-190. 
As to the prayer of the Amended Complaint, the Order of 
the trial court concerning liquidation dated October 24, 1990 did 
not preclude the remedy of liquidation. It merely stated that 
plaintiffs could not rely upon the claimed partial liquidation of 
II to justify the relief sought. ROA at 317. 
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Disallowance of: amendment could cause deprivation of claims. 
Defendants have also argued that new claims should not be 
allowed added at this point. ROA at 569. 
In view of the fact that all of the claims arise in 
whole or in part from the same transactions or occurrences/ there 
may be res judicata effect on all of these claims even if not all 
are pursued. That is, if the applicants do not pursue some of the 
claims contained in the Amended Complaint, and then file a later 
action on those remaining claims, the court hearing that later 
action may find those claims could and should have been litigated 
in this action, in which case they would be barred on the basis of 
the claim preclusion branch of res judicata. Penrod v. Nu Creation 
Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). 
Claims exist on the basis of oppressive conduct. 
With respect to plaintiffs1 claims on the basis of 
oppressive conduct, defendants essentially have moved to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
ROA at 569. 
They state that as a matter of law, there could not have 
been oppressive conduct. They state that the defendants followed 
the law and were legally endowed with the discretion they exercised 
and in no way could there have been oppressive conduct under these 
facts. 
In other words, they contend that it does not matter that 
the plaintiffs could not sell their stock for even as much as 
l/16th of its liquidation valae while defendants used assets of 
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Equitable to pay members of the controlling group 100% of that 
liquidation value for exactly the same stock. 
They would have this Court believe and rule that it does 
not matter that over 25 years passed without a dividend, and that 
it has been over 8 years since the last dividend, with the dividend 
paid three of the years between those periods equalling $.06 per 
share each year it was paid, an annual return for those years of 
less than l/10th of a percent of the stock's liquidation valae. 
It cannot be so easily determined, and certainly not as 
a matter of law, that such conduct is not oppressive. Tn large 
measure, that is because, and appropriately so, oopressive conduct 
is not a rigidly and narrowly defined concept. 
In the case of McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Sons, Inc., 
724 P. 2d 232, 236 (Nf.M. App. 1986), the court stated that "oporassive" 
conduct "is an expansive term that is used to cover a multitude of 
situations dealing with improper conduct." The advantage of 
not having sharply defined rules allows courts to equitably and 
carefully examine whether shareholders are not receiving the 
treatment they reasonably should be able to expect from those 
owing them a fiduciary duty. Id. 
Oppressive conduct is distinguised from, and does not 
necessarily include, illegal or fraudulent behavior. It may 
include situations where the minority shareholder cannot particioate 
in the operation and management of the corporation. It may be 
where the majority has an "imperious attitude" and/or follows an 
"arbitrary, overbearing and heavy-handed course of conduct" sufficient 
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to show oppression. Tjd. at 237. 
Right to amend the prayer to include various remedies 
As mentioned above, defendants urged on several occasions 
that since no relief except for punitive damages was demanded from 
several defendants, no relief could be granted. 
However, olaintiffs are entitled to appropriate relief, 
whether included in the prayer or not. It follows a fortiori that 
they should be allowed to amend the prayer to include that appropriate 
relief. Such an amendment would serve to make more specific 
the part of the prayer of plaintiffs' Complaints which demands 
"such other relief as the Court may deem just and equitable." 
There are many appropriate remedies for oooressive 
conduct found in pertinent cases. For example, the cases of 
McCauley, supra, (defendants had their choice of three options: 
(1) liquidation of the corporation; (2) partition and reorganization; 
or (3) purchase by the corporation of plaintiff's outstanding 
shares); Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903 (Or. Apo. 1989) (defendants 
required to buy the plaintiffs' interests in the company); and Stefano 
v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985) (buy-out ordered at a soecific 
price, an equitable remedy less drastic than dissolution). 
In an early Utah case, Union Savings & Investment 
Co. v. District Court of Utah, 44 Utah 397, 410, 140 Pac. 221 (Utah 
1914), the Court discussed the existence of a broad range of 
remedies, other than dissolution, that courts could employ in 
actions brought by shareholders. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court should have certified the plaintiff 
class under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and not given the members of the class any right to opt out of 
the class. 
The trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that 
there was not "any liquidation" as that term was used in the 
Amended Articles of Incorporation, and thus that there was no 
requirement to evenly allocate the funds paid to the II shareholders. 
The existence of a holding company should not impair the 
rights of the shareholders. These rights include the right to 
share pro rata in any distribution of assets. Directors cannot 
excuse a distribution benefiting only certain shareholders where 
their purpose was to maintain control. 
Where there has been discrimination against certain 
shareholders, these shareholders have a cause of action which is 
not just derivative. They also have a cause of action for punitive 
damages against all involved in a breach of fiduciary duty even 
though their main remedy may be equitable. 
The shareholders had a right to add a cause based on 
oppressive conduct, and to otherwise amend their complaint, especially 
where for the most part the relevant facts were pled in the original 
complaint. 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule 23 provides: 
(a) Prerequisites to a class action. One or more members of a 
class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all 
only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members 
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties 
are tyoical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class. 
(b) Class action maintainable. An action may be maintained as 
a class action if the prerequisites of Subdivision (a) are satisfied, 
and in addition: 
(1) The prosecution of separate actions by or against 
individual members of the class would create a risk of: 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect 
to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible 
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of 
the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the 
interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or 
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their 
interests; or 
(2) The party opposing the class has acted or refused to 
act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making 
appropriate final injuctive relief or corresponding declaratory 
relief with respect to the class as a whole; or 
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(3) The court finds that the questions of law or fact 
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the 
findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in 
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate 
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning 
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the 
class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating 
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the 
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class 
action, 
(c) Determination by order whether class action to be maintained; 
notice; judgment; actions conducted partially as class actions. 
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an 
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order 
whether it is to be maintained. An order under this subdivision 
may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision 
on the merits. 
(2) In any class action maintained under Subdivision (b)(3), 
the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice 
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice 
to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The 
notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude 
him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the 
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judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who 
do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request 
exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his 
counsel. 
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action 
under Subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to 
the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds 
to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained 
as a class action under Subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable 
to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom 
the notice provided in Subdivision (c)(2) was directed, and who 
have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be 
members of the class* 
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained 
as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class 
may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a 
class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be contrued and 
applied accordingly. 
ION CONCERNING PARENT. SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATES 
A. The Company is controlled by Insurance Investment Company, a Utah corporation, which owns 63% of the issued and outstanding common stock of the Company. Insurance 
ivtstment hat two classes of stock. There are 25,000 shares, voting stock and 77,177.5 shares of 6% noncumulativt. nonvoting, $1.00 par value of preferred stock. Ownership 
id control of this voting stock i s described in Schedule Y, Organizational Chart. 
I. Tha Company owns 11,502.23 voting shares and 25,050 preferred shares of Insurance Investment Corporation. 
C. During 1986. the Board of Directors of Equitable l i f t and Casualty Insurance Company (hereafter the 'Company") determined that i t would be in i t s best interest 
5 purchase some of the Company's outstanding common stock and the common and preferred stock of Insurance Investment Company, the Company's parent corporation. The 
tah DeparUnent of Insurance was notif ied of this intent and gave i t s consent to the same where necessary. The stock purchase program would sat is fy any or all of the following 
jrposes: 
(1) To create a market for stockholders desiring to se l l their stock of the Company who have been unable to do so in the past because of lack of marketability. 
(2) To reduce the cost of communication to stockholders. 
(3) To make shares of the Company and Insurance Investment Company available for employee benefit program. 
(4) To make shares of the Company and Insurance Investment Company available for use in the acquisition of other companies. 
(5) To increase the percentage of ownership of Insurance Investment Company in the Company. Such an increase would permit Insurance Investment Company to qualify 
for the 100 percent dividend exclusion for federal income tax purposes and/or e n t i t l e Insurance Investment Company to f i l e a consolidated return with the Company. 
(5) To eliminate the Company's appearance as a potential candidate for an outside takeover. The Company's publicly held stock gave the appearance to uninformed 
individuals that i t was possible to purchase control of the Company by offering to purchase the Company's publicly held stock. Although i t was believed that such 
attempts were f u t i l e , such attempts were nevertheless being made, and were extremely disruptive and detrimental to the operation of the Company. 
On November 17, 1966, the Company in i t ia ted the above purchase plan by so l ic i t ing from i t s shareholders offers to sel l to the Company up to 115,500 shares of i t s outstanding 
1.00 par value common shares for $22.50 per share. The Company acquired 95,652.43 common shares under the so l i c i ta t ion and subsequent purchases for an aggregate cash 
onsideration of $2,152,404. 
On October 31, 19S7, the Company entered into an agreement with a coalition of some of i t s remaining shareholders wherein the Company agreed to purchase 44,544.37 shares of 
ts comron stock, 25,050.66 preferred shares of Insurance Investment Company, 11,802.23 common shares of Insurance Investment Company and 9.793.10 common shares of National Housing, 
-elated corporation, for $1,450,000 cash and the issuance of 363,000 shares of the Company's ne»ly authorized $2.00 par value preferred stock. The Company was required to purchase 
11 of this various stock in order to purchase any of i t . 
Effective April 15, 19&6, National Mousing was merged into the Company. As a result of the merger, the Company acquired 7,365.65 shares of i t s cocoon stock, 4,315 preferred 
hires of Insurance Investment Company and $662,095 in net asse t s , based upon their appraised fair value. In consideration for which, the Company paid $150,000 cash and issued 
10,000 shares of the Company's preferred stock. 
The total consideration paid by the Company under the above acquisitions is comprised of $3,752,404 cash and 403,000 shares of $2.00 par value preferred stock with an assigned 
.ost of $9.229 per share (the Kinircuit redemption price) . Since $662,095 of nonstock assets were received in the National Housing Kerger, the total assigned cost for the treasury 
itock acquired is $6,609,596 (J3.752.404 cash • $3,719,287 (assigned value of preferred stock) — $662,095 (net value of nonstock assets acquired)). The aggregate consideration 
>f $6,609,596 has leer, assigned to the cost of connon treasury stock attributable to the above transaction for financial reporting purposes. During 19W, the Cor^any redeemed 
J6.803.35 shares of i ts preferred stock at an average cost of $10.71 per share. 
The owners of the preltrrt^i stock tuy. in the future, i f the Cocrpany has sufficient earnings in the prior year, cause the Company to purchase up to 40,300 shares per year at a 
^ric§ of $10.72 p*r share plus (or emus) a percentage of earnings (or losses) presented on l ine 31 of the Corrpan)'s Annual Statement. Although the Company does not know whether 
;>r not this right * i l l be exercised, tne Corrany will record a l i a b i l i t y as a write-in iten appearing or page 3 of i t s Annual Statement identifying i t s potential l i a b i l i t y for the 
jutsequert year's purchase. This procedure of recording this l i a b i l i t y has Uren renewed and approved b> the Utah Department of Insurance. 
Tha Corpany's holding of treasury shares consists of 147,573.08 shares of i t s connon stock which are owned directly by the Company and 153,036.28 shares which are held 
indirectly through the Ccxrpiny's 40.3 percent holding (41,167.89 shares) of i t s parent company's capital shares (based on liquidation r ights . Both the directly and indirectly 
held shares are dtr^ ned to be treasury stock by the Company for financial reporting purposes. The Company is holding such shares as treasury stock to satisfy the previously nentioni 
purposes. 
The Cocpany has received accounting assistance fror Peat Kar>uk Ham I Co. and le^al assistance fron Fabian & Clendemn in recording these transactions. 
D. Tha Corpany has no guaranties or undertikings for the benefit of an a f f i l ia te which Right result in a material contingent exposure of the Company's or af f i l ia ted insurer's 
assets to l i a b i l i t y . 
£. The Corpan> do*s not have any 1r.ana9er.ent or service contracts of insuring arrangements with an> af f i l ia ted insurer. 
lb COMPENSATION Ahl RETJREMEKT PUKS 
A. The Corpar.j has an employe* profit sharing plan and a Section 401 (k) plan for the employees. The Company has no retirement plan for i t s agents. The Company's Board of 
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Ms. Mary T. Noonan, Clerk 
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Re: Pond vs. Equitable 
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Dear Ms. Noonan: 
I represent the appellants in the reference aooeal. On 
their behalf T am submitting this letter to you, with seven copies, 
pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Apoellate Procedure 
(Citation of Supplemental Authorities). 
This letter is the limited response to apoellees' submission 
citing that same rule. 
The recent opinion in Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance 
Co. vs. Ross, No. 910746-CA should not have been suoolementally 
cited. This is because it is not a pertinent nor significant 
authority. It does not address the legal issues involved in the 
referenced appeal. It is not evidence of any factual circumstances, 
nor was it before the trial court. 
Yours very truly, 
Copy to: 
P. Bruce Badger 
215 South State 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, 
LYNN P". HEWARD 
Attorney at Law 
Street #1200 
Utah 84151 
